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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1072 
___________ 
 
JESUS ASUNCION PONCE, 
                Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                 Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-690-010) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 25, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 25, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant, Jesus Ponce, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a final 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) 
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order sustaining the charges of removability and ordering him removed.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will deny the petition for review.     
 In 2007, Ponce became a lawful permanent resident of the United States.  In 2012, 
he was convicted in the Superior Court of New Jersey of conspiracy to possess a 
controlled substance, and criminal mischief.  As a result of his conviction for a controlled 
substance offense, he was charged with removability.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  
At a hearing before the IJ on December 19, 2012, Ponce, through his counsel, contested 
the removability charge, arguing that the state judgment of conviction was unclear as to 
the nature of the underlying offense.  He sought a continuance to file a “motion . . . with 
the Criminal Court asking for clarification of the judgment of conviction.”  The Court 
granted the continuance.  At the next hearing on January 14, 2013, Ponce again contested 
the removability charge, arguing that the state judgment of conviction and sentencing 
colloquy were ambiguous as to the nature of the underlying offense; he requested another 
continuance to seek “clarification” from the New Jersey Superior Court.  Over the 
objection of the Government the IJ granted the continuance.   
 At a hearing on January 31, 2013, Ponce asserted that on January 17th, he filed a 
“verify petition”1 with the state court to “clarify the court record,” but that a hearing on 
the issue would not be scheduled for four to six weeks.  The IJ stated that she believed 
the Government had met its burden to establish that Ponce had been convicted of a 
                                              
1 The “verify petition” was a petition for post-conviction relief.   
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controlled substance offense, but nevertheless granted a continuance to allow time for 
Ponce to prove otherwise.   
 Less than two weeks later, on February 11, 2013, the IJ reiterated that the 
Government had established the predicate removal offense by clear and convincing 
evidence.  The IJ verbally sustained the charge of removability, but indicated that Ponce 
could submit any evidence to the contrary.  Ponce asserted that he was told upon filing 
his verify petition that there could be a three-month waiting period; he then requested a 
continuance until that time.  The Court granted a three-week continuance.  At the next 
hearing on March 4th, Ponce stated that he had not had a hearing on his motion, but that 
he expected it would be “sometime in May.”  The IJ indicated that she could not “keep 
postponing the matter for that reason” because of the uncertainty regarding whether or 
how the state court would rule.  Accordingly, the matter was continued, but Ponce was 
advised that, unless he filed an application for relief, the IJ would have “no choice” but to 
order him removed at the next hearing.   
 On March 21, 2013, Ponce indicated that the verify petition was still pending and 
could be for another “three or four months,” but that it was “impossible to predict when 
the [state court’s] going to get to this particular petition.”  The IJ stated that, absent an 
application for relief, she would not grant another continuance.  The IJ then officially 
sustained the charge of removability, and ordered Ponce removed.  The BIA affirmed the 
IJ’s decision on appeal.  Ponce has filed a petition for review, arguing that that the IJ 
abused her discretion in denying the motion for a continuance.     
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 Where, as here, an alien is removable due to a controlled substance offense under 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B), our review is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of 
law[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  We review those claims and questions de novo.  See 
Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 Ponce argues generally that the IJ erred in finding he was convicted of a controlled 
substance offense.  As the IJ noted, it was clear from the judgment of conviction that 
Ponce’s conviction served as a predicate removal offense for purposes of 
§1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Ponce was originally charged with (1) possession of a schedule I, II, 
III or IV substance and (2) criminal mischief.  The first charge was amended to 
conspiracy to possess in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-2; as the IJ concluded, there 
is no support for Ponce’s argument that the amendment to the charges created an 
ambiguity as to whether Ponce was convicted of a drug offense. This conclusion is 
supported by the sentencing colloquy, during which the state attorney indicated, without 
objection from Ponce’s defense counsel, that the defendant pleaded guilty to a “third 
degree conspiracy to possess CDS [controlled dangerous substance] and disorderly 
persons, criminal mischief.”  A.R. at 110; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (listing 
documents in record of conviction IJ may rely on to determine a conviction); Dickson v. 
Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that there are many readily available and 
reliable documents that properly are considered part of the record of conviction such as 
the judgment of conviction or a colloquy transcript).   The state court judge then 
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reiterated that Ponce had pleaded guilty to “a DP [disorderly persons] and third degree 
conspiracy.”  A.R. at 111.  Accordingly, the Board properly affirmed the IJ’s conclusion. 
 Next, Ponce claims that the BIA erred in determining that the IJ did not abuse her 
discretion in refusing to grant a continuance until the state court ruled on his verify 
petition.  He argues that, absent a continuance, he was deprived of the opportunity to 
obtain evidence of post-conviction relief to challenge his removability.  The Government 
argues that we lack jurisdiction to review this claim.   We agree that, to the extent Ponce 
is merely challenging the IJ’s discretionary decision, we lack jurisdiction to review the 
claim.  See Rachak v. Att’y Gen., 734 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Ogunfuye v. 
Holder, 610 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that criminal alien’s “argument that 
the IJ abused its discretion by not granting her a continuance does not present a 
constitutional claim or issue of law that this court has jurisdiction to consider.”).  
However, to the extent Ponce presents a constitutional claim, see Hoxha v. Holder, 559 
F.3d 157, 163 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009), we conclude that the BIA did not err.  See Singh v. 
Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2006) (exercising plenary review over due process 
claims).  The IJ granted five continuances, and each time Ponce’s counsel indicated that 
the time needed was longer than previously noted.  Ponce also failed to provide a copy of 
the verify petition.  Having determined that the judgment of conviction was not 
ambiguous on its face, Ponce had not shown good cause for an additional continuance 
because the likelihood of success of his post-conviction petition was speculative at best.  
See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
6 
 
pendency of post-conviction motion does not negate the finality of convictions for 
immigration removal purposes).2 
 Based on the foregoing, to the extent we have jurisdiction, we will deny the 
petition for review, and otherwise we will dismiss.  
                                              
2  Ponce seeks to raise a claim in his reply brief that the IJ’s denial of a continuance 
deprived him of the benefit of a new immigration policy issued after he was ordered 
removed.  We lack jurisdiction to consider this claim, as he failed to exhaust it before the 
BIA.  See Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005).   
